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Abstract
Relational structure is a primitive notion of Heidegger’s Dasein. By analyzing the concept 
of pros-ti as it emerges from the Heidegger’s 1924 course dedicated to Plato’s Sophist, I out-
line the Platonic and Aristotelic roots of Heideggerian Mitsein. Arguably the Mitsein makes 
explicit the instances of the pros ti — in other words, the instances of Aristotle’s concept of 
relatedness/intentionality that Heidegger ascribes to Plato’s heteron — but giving them 
an existential value, having Heidegger pursued the shift from realism to phenomenology-
existentialism. The article concludes by emphasizing the relevance of these themes for so-
cial ontology. 
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Resumo
A estrutura relacional é uma noção primitiva do Dasein de Heidegger. Ao analisar o conceito 
de pros-ti como emerge de curso de Heidegger, de 1924, dedicado ao Sophist de Platão, eu 
delineio as raízes platônicas e aristotélicas do Mitsein heideggeriano. Sem dúvida o Mitsein 
explicita as instâncias do pros ti — em outras palavras, as instâncias do conceito de paren-
tesco/intencionalidade de Aristóteles, que Heidegger atribui a heteron de Platão — mas 
dando-lhes um valor existencial, tendo Heidegger perseguido a mudança do realismo para 
a fenomenologia-existencialismo. O artigo conclui enfatizando a relevância destes temas 
para ontologia social.
Palavras-chave: Heidegger. Pros ti. Mitsein. Metafísica das relações. Ontologia social.
Introducción
Heidegger’s lectures on the Sophist are of great importance not 
only because through their analysis it is possible to grasp the genesis 
of some central ideas of Sein und Zeit, but also insofar as the formula-
tion of such ideas — which takes place through Heidegger’s reading 
and phenomenological interpretation of books IV and VI of Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics and of  Plato’s Sophist — enables us to outline defin-
ing features of key concepts of Sein und Zeit, in particular on Heidegger’s 
Mitsein. My main thesis is that the Mitsein brings to light instances of 
the pros ti, i.e. the Aristotelic concept of relatedness/intentionality that 
Heidegger ascribes to Plato’s heteron as well, emphatizing the existential 
value of relatedness, freeing it from the mere ontological grounding.
Nevertheless, ontological inquiries are not denied:  for Heidegger 
the concept of pros ti is strictly connected, within the Platonic context, 
to the determination of dynamis, to be understood as relational power, 
and distinguished from kinesis, movement. The ability of weaving re-
lations can be considered therefore as the cipher characterizing the 
Dasein in its relation with intra-worldness: temporality needs to be in-
tended as possibility/power/capability.
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In the first place, I will approach the Platonic text to outline those 
features which, in my perspective, are central for the constitution of 
the Dasein. Subsequently, I will discuss the specific feature of rela-
tion expressed by the Mitsein, underlining the differences between the 
model of relatedness expressed by the pros ti and that expressed by the 
Mitsein. The existential valence of the Mitsein will enable a further in-
vestigation, focusing on the concept of inauthentic relations: by follow-
ing this avenue of research, I will finally advance a personal proposal 
within the field of social ontology.
Plato’s Sophist: Being as heteron
In the ontological digression of the Sophist, Plato, through the 
Eleatic visitor, studies the relations among the most important kinds: 
Being, Change, Changelessness, Sameness and Difference. Moreover, 
he establishes the difference between the concept of absolute non-be-
ing, which can be neither said nor thought, and the concept of relative 
non-being, that in some sense also “is”1.
Being is defined as dynamis, the capacity of weaving bonds — in 
other words, relationships among the elements. In this perspective, the 
concept of heteron is essential, as it defines the vehicle through which 
being, by building relations through a dynamic movement, becomes 
an orderly and connected plurality. This type of Being is different from 
Parmenides’ stable Being, characterized by self-identity: it is a Being 
which tends to approach others.2
The heteron is a very particular kind as it absolves the function of 
connecting the kinds together: “we shall say that pervades them all” 3. 
Plato’s description of the specific relations among the kinds aims at ex-
plaining how certain things can be related, others not. However, relation-
ality represents the pure essence of things: whilst everything is what it 
1 Plato, Soph. 257 b1.
2 For a deeply analysis of the Plato’s ontology or relations, please see L. Candiotto, “Platone e la metafisica delle relazioni”, in 
L. Candiotto (ed.), Senza dualismo. Nuovi percorsi nella filosofia di Platone, Mimesis, Milano-Udine 2015, p. 73-93.
3 Plato, Soph. 255 e 3 - 4.
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is and, at the same time, is different from other things4, something could 
not even be itself if it was not related to something else. Therefore, iden-
tity and difference complement each other in the constitution of things.
I explained elsewhere5 how negation is the specific form of rela-
tion expressed by the heteron. In other words, heteron is the ‘relative 
being’ whose modality of relationship occurs through a ‘not’. This ‘not’ 
expresses thus a specific process of differentiation: identity is reached 
via negationis. In order to underline the centrality of the relational as-
pect, “being not” could be translated (from a theoretical point of view) 
as ‘being with’: negation transfigures from discrete opposition into 
complementary antithesis6.
This shift represents the key point of Heidegger’s interpretation 
of the negation characterizing Plato’s heteron. It is not possible to elabo-
rate further on this aspect of the heteron here, however, as we shall see, 
it plays a central role in the determination of the Mitsein itself.
Heidegger’s Sophist: the heteron as pros ti
For Heidegger it is necessary to proceed hermeneutically from 
the clear to the obscure: the understanding of Plato builds upon the 
reading of Aristotle7. Heidegger could underline the intentional as-
pect of relations deployed in the Platonic dialogue thanks to the study 
of Aristotle, which he carried out during the first part of the lecture 
course mentioned in the first section of this paper. Building on this 
4 N. L. Cordero, “Introduction”. in N. L. Cordero (ed.), Platon: Le Sophiste, GF Flammarion, Paris 1993, p. 11-65, p. 25.
5 L. Candiotto, “The heteron as relational being. Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s Sophist 257b-259d”; D. De Brasi, M. Fuchs 
(ed.), Sophistes. Der platonische Dialog und Heideggers Marburger Vorlesung (WS 1924/25), Duncker & Humblot Verlag, 
Berlin 2016 (forthcoming); L. Candiotto, “Il negativo è anche positivo. La trasfigurazione della negazione tra immediatezza 
e mediazione”, L. Marcato (ed.), Forme della negazione. Un percorso interculturale tra Oriente e Occidente, Mimesis, Milano 
2015, p. 161-178.
6 For more information about the role of  negation in Plato’s philosophy See D. O’Brien, Le non-être. Deux études sur le Sophiste 
de Platon, Akademia Verlag, Sankt Augustin: 1995, and M. Dixsaut, “La negation, le non-être et l’autre dans le Sophiste”, in 
P. Aubenque, M. Narcy (eds), Etudes sur le Sophiste de Platon, Bibliopolis, Roma 1991, p. 167-213.
7 Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA IX, p. 10-12.
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theoretical trajectory, Heidegger establishes a link between the nature 
of the Different and Being as dynamis. 
The dynamis of Being should be understood as pros ti, i.e. as an 
ontological attitude directed to the establishment of relations8. This 
attitude is captured by the meaning of Being as heteron (Difference). 
Heidegger defines the heteron as pros ti: relational intentionality. 
Relations are logical and linguistic but also ontological. Logos means 
relation (Beziehung), Being is not one but many. Accordingly, reality 
has a dialectical structure: it is characterized by the capacity (dynamis) 
to take together (koinonein) different parts as related (pros ti). 
Relation connects two different things but such things can be dif-
ferent only in virtue of their relation (Soph. 255 d 1). In other words, “…
we find that what is other must of necessity be what it is in relation to 
some other” (Soph. 255 d 6-7)9. Accordingly, identity is guaranteed by 
difference from what is different: A is A because it is different from — 
A. Difference itself, by excluding the identity between terms, guarantees 
the identity of every-thing. Through this trajectory, Heidegger recovers 
the centrality of the pros ti qua relatedness: the heteron is the non being 
of something in the sense of being what is “different from” (heteron pros) 
that something. In this perspective, Heidegger emphasizes that the “not” 
is not to be understood as the empty field of an arbitrary nothingness, 
but as heteron allou tinos, the ‘not’ of an ‘other’ (p. 391). As we shall see, 
thanks to this process it will be possible to understand otherness as a 
concrete other.
I agree with Andrea Le Moli who stresses that the centrality of 
the heteron as pros ti is the key point of Heidegger’s interpretation of the 
Sophist10. He emphasizes how this approach to otherness produces a 
radical transformation of the concept of einai, which implies the funda-
mental capacity of weaving relations and establishing communication 
among the several kinds entering in its constitution. 
8 D. Ambuel, Image and Paradigm in Plato’s Sophist, Parmenides Publishing, Las Vegas 2006, p. 113-117. 
9 The Dialogues of Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett, V4 of 5, 3rd edition, 1892.
10 A. Le Moli, Heidegger e Platone. Essere, Relazione, Differenza, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2002, p. 26, 45.
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For Heidegger, the establishment of relations is animated by the 
heteron rather than by the kinesis: ‘I emphasize explicitly that the heter-
on, not the kinesis, is the dialectical theme, although the latter is spoken 
of constantly in what follows. Kinesis is only the guideline for showing 
the universal presence of the heteron throughout all gene’ (p. 379).
The image of temporality emerging from the Heideggerian in-
terpretation of the Sophist, is not that of a physical becoming but one 
based on the possibility of relation. Such temporality is intrinsic to 
being itself as heteron. It is important to emphasize how these reflec-
tions represent some of the fundamental traits of Heidegger’s thought 
in Sein und Zeit: the interpretation of the pros ti enabled Heidegger to 
grasp not only the relational structure of intra-worldness, but also the 
fundamental nexus between being and time (temporality being intend-
ed here as possibility). 
The intentional structure of Dasein
The complementarity existing within relations implies the fact 
that the relation itself is not a bystander between two terms, but the 
very being of such terms establishing both their identity and mutual 
difference. There cannot be an A without a B: there is only an A with a 
B, and a B with an A.
In this perspective, identity does not configure a tautology tout 
court (as maintained by Parmenidean logic), but implies the establish-
ment of a relation with difference.  Insofar as communication among 
the kinds is characterized by an ordered structure, it becomes possible 
to think not only a new meaning of non-being but also a diversity and 
new meaning of identity. Arguably, Plato aimed at proposing a new 
meaning for the concepts of identity and difference by enframing them 
within an ontology of relations.
The passage from the Sophist to Sein und Zeit is accomplished 
through Husserl’s phenomenology. By applying a phenomenological 
method to the reading of Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger is able to indi-
viduate a relational structure which becomes intentional with Husserl, 
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thus inherent to the human world. A radical difference emerges within 
the continuity between the Sophist and Sein und Zeit — a difference 
which can be arguably considered as a cipher of the wider discontinu-
ity between ancient and modern philosophy: Heidegger’s Mitsein does 
not refer anymore to pure relatedness among objects at an ontological 
level but to the relational nexus with the other which constitutes hu-
man experience. Obviously, Heidegger’s philosophy still aims to oper-
ate at an ontological level, however, in order to do so, it will not use the 
“realist” ontology characterizing classical thought — Heidegger will 
rather argue that experience itself is what constitutes essence: “Das 
‘Wesen’ des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz” 11.
It is possible to notice here the intentional structure of Dasein: 
that which comprehends, reaches out essentially towards the compre-
hended; through this reaching out it grasps its own intimate structure. 
That which comprehends is, for its own nature, striving towards what 
is other than itself, it is thus a Zu-Sein. Due to this structural mediation 
between what comprehends and what is comprehended the Dasein 
reaches outside itself. It is for this reason that Heidegger uses the term 
“ex-sistence”, relational ecstaticity.
From realism to the existential 
Notwithstanding the continuity explored in the previous sec-
tions, it is necessary to grasp also the radical differences between pros 
ti and Mitsein. 
Heidegger’s world is not an already constituted plurality but 
what constitutes itself thanks to the intentional character of the Dasein. 
The world is not an ensemble of entities but the world (Zustand) in 
which the totality of the entity posits itself. This operation can be done 
in different ways: there are therefore different worlds. Epistemology 
does not predicate upon a pre-constituted ontological domain: it is 
not possible to define subject and object as discrete, self-contained 
11  M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, GA II, p. 42.
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instances, and knowledge as a relational operation connecting them. 
On the contrary, relation is what originally constitutes both subject and 
object. The pros ti is not a moment of the kat’autò but what constitutes 
the kat’autò. In this perspective it is possible to notice a fundamental 
discontinuity between Plato and Heidegger — a discontinuity which 
marks the passage from a realist to a phenomenological-existential ap-
proach, and which has been underlined by Heidegger himself in his 
observations concerning the inner limitation of Greek ontology.
The Mitsein can be defined as our being together with one an-
other in the world. This definition immediately brings into play ethical 
implications. The passage from the “realism” of the pros ti to the “expe-
riential” of the Mitsein enables us to approach immediately the field of 
reflection concerning the relational structure of reality and the specific 
modalities through which relations are established both among human 
beings and between human beings and things, the Dasein and its envi-
ronment. The Dasein is in fact an In-der-Welt-sein (Being-in-the-world), 
and a Mitsein, a being with. “With” expresses here an existential: as the 
Dasein is essentially a Mitsein, it encounters other Dasein.
Also in the ancient world the ontological dimension has an ethi-
cal and political valence; however in Heidegger the ontological struc-
ture of the Mitsein is immediately ethical, due to its experiential es-
sence. For Heidegger this ethical meaning implies also a critique of the 
contemporary situation: the relations that human beings establish with 
things are instrumental, those established with other human beings are 
inauthentic. The inauthenticity of relations is caused by the inability to 
recognize otherness in the other: the undifferentiated “they” defines 
what is valid for everyone and no-one. 
The relational structure outlined by Heidegger is not oriented 
towards a romantic hen kai pan or a Spinozian pantheism — on the con-
trary, the principle of identity is precisely what is responsible for the 
inauthenticity of relations. An authentic relation can be realized only 
by preserving the radical difference between self and other. As a further 
avenue of reflection, it is possible to point out how the strands of femi-
nist thought inspired by Heideggerian philosophy — Luce Irigaray can 
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be mentioned here as a foremost example — will formulate the catch-
phrase “thinking the difference” to effectively signify the irreducibility 
of two wholes, in this case the masculine and feminine. 
The relation implied by the Mitsein is not, therefore, a relation 
between imperfect parts necessitating one another in order to be com-
plete; it is rather a relation between two fully constituted wholes. Also 
from this perspective it is possible to grasp a profound chasm separat-
ing Heidegger’s approach from Plato’s philosophy as expressed in the 
Sophist and other works. The concept of relation for Heidegger does 
not entail a strife for re-constituting an ancient nature, lost due to an 
original scission (we are referring here to the speech by Aristophanes 
in the Symposium), it is not what enables an organic image of the whole, 
where each part absolves its task (e.i. the constitution of the soul and 
the state in the Republic or the cosmos in the Timaeus); it is rather a 
shared space whereby the decision to act authentically bears an exis-
tential import.
Mitsein and appearing
John Sallis maintains that “the having in common” of the kinds is 
“a showing of themselves in community”12. Arguably, the revealing as-
pect characterizing the communication of the kinds is due to the trans-
categorical valence of the Different. In other words, the whole process 
is enabled by the revealing aspect of negation (hence the key meaning 
of the heteron as pros ti). The identity of relation and appearing is also 
a characterizing feature of the Dasein. The intentionality of the Dasein 
constitutes itself as an opening of spatiality: Erschlossenheit.13
The Da constituting the existential being-there of being is what 
determines this aspect of openness. 
12  J. Sallis, Being and Logos. Reading the platonic dialogues, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996, pp. 
505-506. For a phenomenological reading of the Sophist cf.  A. Vasiliu, Dire et voir. La parole visible du Sophiste, Vrin, Paris 
2008; L. Candiotto, “The Children’s Prayer: saving the Phenomena in Plato’s Sophist”, ANAIS DE FILOSOFIA CLÁSSICA, vol. V nº 
9, 2011, p. 77- 85. ISSN 1982-5323, http://www.ifcs.ufrj.br/~afc/ 
13 M. Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality and Obligation, Rownamm & Littlefield, Lanham 1996.
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The opening is intended as light, as manifestation of being. 
However, Heidegger does not refer this process uniquely to a mani-
festation of the physis: he approaches rather the opening in its exis-
tential acception, thus as comprehension (Verstehen) and feelings 
(Befindlichkeit). In other words, Heidegger refers here to the modes of 
appearing of relations among human beings, and between human be-
ings and things. 
Heidegger proposes here an ontological conception of appear-
ing. However, whilst using a key term of classic ontology, he is not as-
suming the same realist position predicated by the theorein.  The main 
concern underpinning Heidegger’s position is rather to demonstrate 
how the ontological dimension is the existential. In this perspective, 
the manifestation of relations among human beings and between hu-
man beings and things is always informed by the particular way in 
which such relations are established, which is not neutral but marked 
by comprehension and feelings. For this reason Heidegger defines the 
element characterizing every human action as care. This concept rep-
resents even more clearly the existential aspect of the Mitsein: it does 
not necessarily aim to endow relatedness with a positive character (the 
“care” of an object implies often its technical employment) but rather 
to emphasize its experiential component. 
Negation as refusal of the “they”
In Brief über den “Humanismus” Heidegger identifies the cause of 
the existence of being in the Verfallen, the forgetfulness of the meaning 
of being, and presents the remembrance (Erinnerung) of the truth of be-
ing as the main condition for an authentic existence.
By focusing on the first Heidegger, and in particular on the rela-
tion between his lectures on the Sophist and Sein und Zein, it is argu-
ably possible to individuate the origin of inauthenticity in the inability 
to recognize differences within relations. In other words, I propose to 
consider the heteron as the defining feature of both pros ti and Mitsein. 
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Due to the original “not” which constitutes the heteron, the rela-
tion is not a mere identification of differents. The “not” does not imply 
absence of relation or separation, but indicates a distance that is neces-
sary in order for every-thing to maintain its nature. It is for this rea-
son that Heidegger, commenting on the Sophist, argues that the “not” 
reveals the thing itself. In fact, the “not” allows the thing to be finite 
and complete in itself. However, in Heidegger’s ontology, this does 
not imply returning to a metaphysics of presence but recognizing that 
the relation which is constitutive of the world creates objects which are 
finite and complete.  Moreover, it also implies preserving the finitude-
determinateness of things without subsuming them in an undifferenti-
ated whole. 
Accordingly, Heidegger’s approach enables us to grasp a relat-
edness which does not deny difference in view of a greater, complete 
relational whole, but which, thanks to negation, affirms the determi-
nateness of every-thing within its very relational constitution. The be-
ing of any self is constituted by its not-being what is other than itself. 
Being and Otherness do not exist independently, but constitute them-
selves thanks to this relation of negation.
Conclusion: ancient and contemporary Heidegger. From Greek philosophy 
to social ontology.
Arguably, in order to comprehend Heidegger’s existential per-
spective, it is also necessary to grasp the practical significance of the 
theoretical positions delineated in the previous sections, moving per-
haps beyond the author’s own intentions. How should we understand 
the effort of letting the other be in its own difference?
Heidegger delineates an existential situation in which most re-
lations are inauthentic, and individuates its cause in the indifference 
characterizing technical domination. If mere indifference creates the 
anonymity of the “they”, where things become objects of domination, 
then the recognition of difference requires a space where it is possible 
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to seek an authentic relation with the other as different, to recognize 
the other as a subject rather than an object. A change of perspective of 
this magnitude bears consequences in a number of domains: it con-
cerns not only human relations but also the relations between human 
beings and the environment. Therefore it presents implications which 
are not only philosophical but also ethical and political.
Framed from this perspective, the concept of distance appears 
tightly connected to that of negation. However, negation is here some-
thing different from separation-opposition – as explained by Plato in 
the Sophist14, and as emphasized by Heidegger in the passage under 
analysis15, the heteron is what establishes relations, thereby manifest-
ing distinction. This type of negation represents an unusual instance 
within the history of western philosophy16 and requires, to be com-
prehended, a horizon of ontic relatedness grounded in an ethical mo-
ment of the recognition of otherness. The ethical foundation of ontic 
relatedness endows the classic concept of pros ti and the Heideggerian 
Mitsein with a propulsive aspect of commitment towards the creation 
of authentic relations grounded on the notion of Difference. 
If we define social ontology as a discipline investigating the stat-
ute of the relation which human beings entertain among themselves 
and with the environment, then it is possible to maintain that the anal-
ysis conducted so far demonstrated how Heidegger was also a social 
ontologist. The Dasein, in its being instantiated in reality, is the true 
social agent which finds in the Mitsein its particular form of action.
Moreover, in this perspective, Heidegger’s Mitsein represents a 
fundamental contribution for social ontology. Margaret Gilbert17 con-
siders the pronoun “we” as the main indicator of social action, which 
14 Plato, Soph. 257 b9-c3.
15 For a study on the Heideggerian interpretation of this passage,  cf. L. Candiotto “The heteron as relational being. Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Plato’s Sophist 257b-259d”, D. De Brasi, M. Fuchs (eds.), Sophistes. Der platonische Dialog und Heideggers 
Marburger Vorlesung (WS 1924/25), Duncker & Humblot Verlag, Berlin 2014 (forthcoming).
16 For an investigation on the conception of negation in the history of western philosophy cf. L. V. Tarca, Differenza e negazione. 
Per una Filosofia Positiva, La città del sole, Napoli 2001.
17 M. Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality and Obligation, Rownamm & Littlefield, Lanham 1996.
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implies a “plural subject” 18 and not a simple sum of two or more indi-
viduals. Accordingly, the analysis focusing on the particular form of 
relatedness instantiated by the Mitsein should prompt us to investigate 
further the relation between the parts constituting the “we”. In other 
words, Heidegger’s approach invites us to treat the mereological foun-
dation of social ontology.
The “plural subject”, however, stems from a common choice. 
Arguably, also this aspect is consistent with Heidegger’s thought, in 
particular concerning the central role of the decision for the ontic es-
tablishment of relation. 
As conclusion I would like to emphasize the contemporary rel-
evance of Heidegger’s approach, both for its potential applications to 
the field of ethics, and for contemporary research in the domain of the 
metaphysics of relations. Interestingly, this relevance emerges particu-
larly within a dimension of inquiry that Heidegger assimilates from 
ancient philosophy. In Heidegger’s philosophy the ancient and the 
contemporary can thus establish a fertile relation, whilst maintaining 
their radical difference.
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